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Intermezzo 
We have seen that Böhm-Bawerk aimed to make scientific progress after Classical 
Economics. He tried to do so by theoretical unification, that is by conceptual and 
explanatory unification. He also tried to choose the ‘right’ level of complexity of 
the explanans in order to leave nothing unexplained of what should be accounted 
for. 
In what follows I want to show that Böhm-Bawerk’s endeavour to theoreti-
cally progress raises questions concerning (1) the empirical content of economic 
theories, (2) the prior convictions economists can be assumed to have in this en-
deavour, (3) the feasibility of explanatory progress in contrast to predictive pro-
gress, (4) the role of abstraction in economic method and (5) the existence of 
economists’ essentialist convictions. 
These points have been discussed in the previous two chapters as well. But 
they have significance beyond the case of Böhm-Bawerk and even beyond econom-
ics. They are not restricted to the idiosyncratic case of these chapters, which talk 
just of a particular economist’s way of developing his research program in the 
history of Austrian Economics. In this intermezzo I shall glance over points (1) to 
(5) in a perspective that is broader in two ways: broader than that of an interest 
merely in Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell and broader than economics as a social 
science. First, I believe that the five issues bear on the development of conceptual 
apparatus of economics even today. But secondly, if this is true, it is evident that 
the role of economics as a study of (an aspect of) the social is being contested; 
certainly when its important role as producer of policy recommendations is con-
cerned. 
This intermezzo serves as the path toward the chapters III to V, which dis-
cuss these matters more in depth. All three chapter to come are relevant for these 
broader perspectives. 
1 Empirical progress? 
Many jokes about economics mock its alleged poor predictive record and its use of 
strong assumptions such that it applies only to very special cases, which will never 
occur in reality. Both allegations attack the irrelevance of economics as a source of 
fruitful (economic) policy recommendations. At the same time, many research 
institutions emit studies with predictions on the basis of economic indicators. 
Generally, economists produce predictions about economic variables with much 
more precision than sociologists do with regard to other social variables. This is 
one of the causes of economics being classified as ‘the queen of the social sciences’ 
(be it that this appraisal is sometimes uttered with intended irony). If economics as 
a discipline does so badly in prediction, it is a mystery why it does so well in the 
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Many economic predictions go with a wide margin of error, which increases 
with the length of the period the prediction applies to. This makes economics an 
easy target for the joke that ‘God created economists in order to make weather 
forecasters look fine’. Indeed, many similarities between economics and meteorol-
ogy strike the eye, including this curious mixture of public mockery and accep-
tance of its predictios. But economic prediction is not only in demand by the public 
for practical reasons, it is also a scarce good for economists themselves. Predictions 
are needed to test theoretical hypotheses.  
However, Neil de Marchi has noted that economic theory alone yields few 
unambiguous predictions. Economics has developed purely theoretically since the 
eighteenth century as ‘political economy’ and until deep in the twentieth century 
economists did not deduce testable hypotheses at all.1 De Marchi therefore ob-
serves that ‘Popper’s critical rationalism actually involves a change of style in 
terms of the way economists engage in debate‘ [over the comparative appraisal of 
two competing theories]. His history of the atmosphere at the London School of 
Economics in the nineteen sixties depicts how after the publication of the transla-
tion of Popper’s (1934) Logik der Forschung, in 1959, the LSE economists wanted to 
derive testable hypotheses from their theories, for instance in order to compare 
their success relative to Chicago economic theories. It turned out very difficult, 
DeMarchi concludes.2 Problems concerning the derivation of empirical tests had 
moved into the focus of attention in London already over the fifties, after Milton 
Friedman’s (1953) The Methodology of Positive Economics had stressed testability as 
well. Furthermore, for qualitative predictions – predictions as to the direction rather 
than the size of the change of a variable – one needed measurement of quantities. 
As causal influences work in opposite directions, the specification of the direction 
of the net outcome that theorists are interested in involves quantification.3  
The want for testability and for quantification came with the insistence on 
these practices by the LSE professors Archibald and Lipsey, respectively. DeMarchi 
contends that Popperian philosophy ‘has no compelling answers’ to either need. 
The Duhem-Quine problem of underdetermination in case of falsification and the 
prior need to specify a model that fits the problem context stood in the way of 
testing. The specification of error terms stood in the way of quantification. 
The tools both for testing and for quantification come from econometrics. 
According to Bert Hamminga, econometricians maintain a remarkable relationship 
with theoretical economists. Econometric modelling, the argument goes, aims to 
tract and identify variables in data sets. It requires very strict specifications while, 
in contrast, economic modelling seems to engage in a loosening of the specifying 
labour. Hamminga pretends to prove the autonomy of each discipline relative to 
the other (called ‘the mutual independency thesis’; see below for a discussion). The 
discipline that develops the fundamental theories and the discipline that enables 
 
1 DeMarchi (1988), p.142. 
2 Although Lipsey has a more positive memory of this episode (personal correspondence). 





testing are said to stand isolated. What the one does is not recorded by the other. 
He argues that, at least in the case of international trade theory: 
neither some kind of realism [realisticness] of some kind of assumption nor 
the conformity of predictions to reality, play a fundamental role in theory de-
velopment.4 
If this is true, doubt is cast on the predictive record of at least the neoclassical 
economics of international trade. Hammninga researched trade theory from the 
factor price equalisation theorem5 to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem6. 
2 Progress by appeal to prior plausibility? 
’Every Ohlin-Samuelson programme participant seems to “have” a System of 
Elementary Plausibility Convictions’ (SEPC), Hamminga says.7 These SEPC differ, 
both among economists and among points in time of theory development. Clearly, 
SEPC are a priori. They direct research in a context of discovery. Very little is said 
about measurable economic processes although the SEPC always have some rela-
tion to the ‘real world’. Hamminga phrases a first, tentative approach to interpret 
the notion of ‘the plausibility of a theorem’ as 
the probability of the theorem being true in the “real world”, where the “real 
world” is just one of the worlds that can be expressed by means of the econo-
mists’ language (production functions, utility functions, factor endowments). 
If a theorem holds in many worlds that can be expressed in the economists’ 
language the probability of the theorem being true in our real world is high, 
even without considering at all what our real world is exactly like.8 
Purely mathematical methods can be employed so as to increase the plausi-
bility of an economic theorem, because a proposition of economic theory is a mere 
metatheoretical provability theorem. Kuipers concludes: 
[Hamminga’s] diagnosis of the mathematical nature of economics may be an 
important underlying motive for the striking ambivalence of economists 
about the question of whether economics is an empirical social science or not. 
Moreover, the diagnosis illustrates that the cognitive aims of the social sci-
ences in general and of economics in particular appear to be less evident than 
philosophers of science use to assume on the basis of an analogy to the natural 
sciences.9 
In his study, Hamminga describes four strategies of theory development in in-
ternational trade theory, none of which has anything to do with testing competing 
hypotheses. Therefore his example shows that progress in theoretical economics 
sticks to delivering fundamental explanatory hypotheses in a way which is quite 
 
4 Hamminga (1983), p.160.  
5 In consequence of free trade the same factor of production in different countries will be rewarded 
equally. 
6 International trade lowers the reward for the relatively scarce (more expensive) factor in a country. 
Hence, a tariff benefits the scarce factor. 
7 Ibidem, p.95. 
8 Ibidem, p.71.  
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disobedient to Popperian methodology. All four strategies build on alterations of 
Propositions of Economic Theory (PET). A PET describes an implication with a field 
and a number of conditions in the antecedent and a so-called Interesting Theorem (IT) 
in the consequent. In Hamminga’s somewhat informal way, a PET has this form: 
 
PET: Field, conditions, →    IT 
 
This formulation makes it clear that the PET is metatheoretical.10 I shall now 
give a brief review of each ingredient of the conditional. Before that, let me just 
give an example. A PET can be the meta-theorem that the Stolper-Samuelson IT 
(that the scarcest factor will be remunerated less after trade opens) can be proved 
on the domain of two countries, two goods and two factors, given the special con-
ditions that production functions are homogenous to the degree one and that the 
factors are immobile between the two countries. 
In the consequent of the PET we find the IT. This is the intended implication 
of the conditions. For example, the factor-price equalisation theorem is an IT and 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is another IT. Economists try to formulate such 
theorems as surprising or at least new claims under conditions that are ‘plausible’. 
A theorem is interesting if it influences discussions among economists or among 
the public when economic policy measures are at stake. 
Let me start with the antecedent of the PET. The field is the domain of the IT. 
It is specified as c countries, f productive factors, and g goods: Fc-f-g. One strategy of 
theory development by the alteration of the PET is field extension. If the IT can be 
proved for a ‘F2-2-2’, and next also for ‘F2-2-3’ (or for Fc-f-g, 2 < c, f, g ≤ z; z being any 
reasonable number in terms of the number of countries, goods and factors as we 
generally encounter these in the actual world), it has become more interesting, be-
cause more plausible. Intuitively, this increased plausibility is related to the fact that 
countries in fact do not trade bilaterally only, certainly not in only two goods, and 
that productive factors are many (taking land, human capital, and risk taking into 
account). The quest for ‘field plausibilism’, then, is one strategy to progress. 
The conditions in the antecedent are (1) the set of fundamental (neoclassical) 
convictions and concepts by which the programme is governed and (2) any num-
ber of special conditions. The convictions are called Fundamentals of Economic 
Analysis (FEA), together with some Explanatory Ideal (EI). The special conditions 
are for example strictures on slopes of functions, or on the available endowments. 
The FEA are, it seems to me, much like symbolic generalisations and meta-
physical paradigms of the Kuhnian disciplinary matrix. For instance, we have 
encountered the FEA of what I shall loosely call ‘the classical programme’ in the 
previous two chapters. The classical programme is what Böhm-Bawerk attacked in 
his critique of the Kostengesetz, that prices (and costs) reflect values and these in 
turn reflect the (labour) costs of production. The ‘explanatory ideal’ (EI), in turn, is 
 
10 The arrow ‘’ can be read as a material implication here. Hamminga does not discuss the problem 





a term from Toulmin’s (1972) Human Understanding. Hamminga characterizes it in 
a way that makes it fit into what Kuhn called values (on how to solve puzzles) and 
exemplars.11 Indeed, although Hamminga does not explicitly equate his circum-
scriptions to these distinct elements from the disciplinary matrix, he compares 
entire paradigms (in the sense of ‘group commitments’ as a whole) with the com-
bination of FEA and EI.12 The classical EI was the canon answering the question 
why countries engage in trade instead of being autarkic. Ricardo had said that this 
was due to differing labour productivities (and therefore differing end prices) for 
different end goods in the respective countries. The neoclassical EI is opposed to 
this: assuming identical production functions, but differing factor endowments. 
One country would produce more labour intensively than the other. 
The three remaining strategies for theory development are all ways of look-
ing for ‘conditions plausibilism’. Hamminga distinguishes weakening of conditions, 
replacing conditions by other conditions with deeper concepts, and constructing 
alternative special conditions such that the former cannot be deduced from the 
latter or vice versa. These strategies differ but I shall discuss weakening only. 
The conditional PET is strengthened if the antecedent is weakened. The de-
creasing strictness on the number of countries, for example, comes with more 
plausibility, as many more countries than two actually do engage in trade.13 An-
other strategy is weakening of the special conditions. These are substituted by a 
new set of special conditions that can be derived from but are not equivalent to the 
old set. One result of the Stolper-Samuelson investigations was the theorem that 
the scarce factor in a country would benefit from an import tariff, under the rather 
special conditions that one country is small and the other big (in terms of domestic 
income) and hence that the terms of trade are constant.14 It could be shown that 
these conditions rested on particular underlying conditions concerning factor 
endowments, utility functions and production functions. Hamminga compares this 
form of progress with the description of the earth as the centre of gravity for the 
 
11 Hamminga equates the FEA with a ‘world view’. I do not see why he excludes the EI from the refer-
ence of this concept. Kuhnian exemplars are standard ways to solve puzzles. As the paradigmatic 
‘world view’ includes exemplars, it should include the entire FEA-EI couple. 
12 Hamminga (1983), pp.123-126. He notes that at a more specific level than that of an entire world view, 
a description of economic research deviates from Kuhn’s very typical natural science examples. In a 
normal science period, physicists for example do not look for so-called ‘Interesting Theorems’ or for 
(the conditions that are true in) hypothetical worlds in which these theorems are true. In revolu-
tionary science, new paradigms give a blow to old ones due to the prediction of new phenomena, 
but the trade theory programme did not look for (new or old) real phenomena at all. Hamminga 
lists more differences.  
13 Hamminga finds many allusions to the notion of ‘plausible’ in what he calls ‘a fountain of expres-
sions’ as economists employ these. Take for instance the likelihood that there are more goods than 
factors of production; or the conditions having or lacking economic meaning. In the case of ‘lacking 
meaning’ they use terms like pathological, artificial, and implausible. 
14 A small country is one which cannot influence world market prices or the ‘terms of trade’. In fact, this 
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moon orbit first under the special conditions that the moon does not also attract the 
earth, and in the next step assuming that it does.15  
I shall restate Hamminga’s account with the help of the following figure. 
Note, meanwhile, that IT’s receive their plausibility from the conditions from 
which they are derived. Weaker conditions are more plausible than stronger condi-
tions. The condition that countries do not specialize but diversify in production is 
more plausible because it is weaker: its extension is wider, more possible worlds 
satisfy it. At the same time, if conditions are weakened, the PET becomes stronger 





 excluded possibilities of PET-C 
 
 excluded possibilities of PET-C* 
Extension of conditions, IT’s and PET’s 
PET-C is the conditional C→IT and PET-C* is the stronger C*→ IT. In the 
figure, the box represents all logically possible worlds. The worlds where condi-
tions C and C* are the case form subsets of these logical possibilities. C = C1……Cj, 
i.e. the FEA-, EI-, and special conditions that lead to the IT, are itself true of worlds 
in the subset denoted C in the figure. The weaker the conditions are, the stronger 
the conditional (the PET). C* (= C*1……C*k) is weaker than C, so C* has a greater 
extension than C, it excludes less. The following holds: 
 
15 See Hamminga (1983), p.52. New conditions with regard to demand and import elasticities were 
introduced by Lloyd Metzler in 1940. They were weaker, because they allowed that an increase or 
decrease in trade altered the rate of exchange in both of two countries instead of only in one of 
them. The original Stolper-Samuelson result turned out to be a special case of the Metzler result. 
16 Note that the IT need not be more interesting due to this. Some IT’s are not economically meaningful, 
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C ⊆ C*  → [[PET-C]] ⊇ [[PET-C*]] 
(The symbol [[ … ]] here means ‘the extension of …’, i.e. [[PET]] is the domain on 
which the PET can be proved.) Increasing plausibility can be interpreted in this 
representation as a growing number of worlds satisfying both the conditions and 
the IT. Of course, each relevant PET is satisfied trivially anywhere else in the box. 
But the economists’ feeling of likelihood of the interesting theorem is generated by 
the proof that, besides C-worlds there are more hypothetical worlds such as w’ and 
w’’, for which the interesting theorem is true. In other words: PET-C* can be 
proved to hold in worlds w’ and w’’ too. The ‘trick’, then, is to increase plausibility 
of IT’s by showing that there is an increased number of worlds in which these must 
be true. In this sense, plausibility also has ontic implications. 
So, if Hamminga is right, economists try to weaken conditions so as to raise 
the plausibility of the theorems they find interesting. I have translated this into the 
claim that economists aim for a greater strength of a Proposition of Economic 
Theory. Although intuitive knowledge plays a role in this development strategy, 
observable or measurable economic phenomena do not. 
However, it is clear that the discipline also, and often, tries to measure real 
phenomena. Without this no sensible policy advice is possible. Empirical work is 
centred in econometric work. In order to measure economic phenomena, well 
specified variables must be sought; and the more specific the claims of researchers 
are, the stronger they are. 
Weakening of conditions is precisely the opposite of strengthening the defi-
nitions needed to identify the data (already available or to be collected). As Ham-
minga says, in econometrics ‘minimum requirements for identifiability [of a vari-
able] are far stronger than the special conditions used in the Ohlin-Samuelson 
programme’.17 For instance, production functions must be specified. But the trade 
theory of Hamminga’s case says nothing about how to specify ‘identifiable mathe-
matical models’ for structural conditions under which production takes place. 
There are also anchoring problems for econometricians. That is, it is not clear from 
the theory how to select variables from data sets and interpret them correctly as 
endogenous or exogenous. To quote Hamminga’s example, how should we know 
whether the 1947 US economy approximates a two factor economy near equilib-
rium? So he asserts: 
One of the great misconceptions of theoretical economists on the nature of 
their own enterprise is that the notion of “Heckscher-Ohlin theory” unambi-
guously denotes some element in the structure of economic expositions.18 
Thus, Hamminga arrives at his blatantly dramatic ‘mutual independency 
thesis’, which says that ‘results of econometric research cannot in the least affect 
the dynamics of the Ohlin-Samuelson programme’.19 And although his conclusions 
are derived from a case study of international trade, his pretension clearly is that it 
 
17 Hamminga (1983), p.98. 
18 Ibidem, p.99. 
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stretches beyond that and applies to all theoretical economics. Econometric practice 
cannot help economics in theory evaluation. So while de Marchi concluded earlier 
that deriving testable hypotheses from economic theories is difficult, Hamminga 
believes that econometrics is not tailored to the practices of theoretical economists. 
It seems to me that de Marchi and Hamminga refer to the very same problem; that 
is, Lipsey and Archibald, who had wanted to do testing at the LSE, bumped into 
the problems the origin of which is explained by Hamminga’s research. Thomas 
Mayer apparently agrees. He contends in his (1993) that (what he calls) formalist 
theory and empirical science theory ‘invoke widely different criteria in evaluating 
theories’.20 Mayer proposed to ‘honour them both’, i.e. to allow each sub-discipline 
to have a life independently from each other. 
However, although evaluation problems related to the divide between the 
need for theory and the requirement of tailoring an adequate basis for producing 
evidence to it certainly exist, they are not only due to the different specification 
orientations of economics and econometrics. Another problem is that the context of 
justification and the context of discovery are severely entangled. Recent research 
finds that, as regards economics, the usual assumptions that theories, models, and 
data are clearly separated and that empirical assessment comes after model build-
ing are both false Boumans (1997). Criteria for the quality of mathematical models 
are a priori. They stipulate requirements that models help find solutions to theo-
retical problems, explain phenomena, hint to policies, or simply provide a mathe-
matical conception of relevant phenomena without further derived uses.21 Eco-
nomic models transform ingredients such as empirical facts and theoretical ideas, 
metaphors, stylized facts, mathematical concepts, and policy views into a coherent 
mathematical form. Some properties of convenience are introduced into the model 
as a special case of mathematical moulding. Furthermore, in order to develop the 
best model, it has to be calibrated. The parameters must fit the data and all the 
other ingredients, and make sure that the model is ‘true for all the ingredients’22. 
But there is no unique manual for the construction of the model, and for each new 
investigation there seems to be another recipe. Thus, Boumans compares economic 
model building to baking a cake without recipe. The economist cooks and tastes at 
the same time, adjusting the cooking process according to his liking: ‘a new recipe 
is a manual for a successful integration of a new set of ingredients’23. The emphasis 
is to stress that other procedures could have rendered perhaps not an identical but 
at least an equally satisfactory result. It is a trial and error process. 
It is safe to conclude that simple deductive-nomological schemata do little 
justice to the sort of scientific development patterns we should be able to find in 
economics. The strategy Böhm-Bawerk followed in order to do better than the 
Classical Economists boils down – as I have shown – to trying to make explanatory 
 
20 Mayer (1993), p.36. 
21 Boumans (1997), p.28. 
22 Ibidem, p.27. It seems to be more appropriate to speak of ‘valid’ instead of ‘true’ here. 
23 Ibidem, p.2. See also Boumans (2003). He inserted the italic ‘a’ in order to stress that it concerns one out 





progress. The proof for the comparative advantage of Austrian subjective value 
theory pops up occasionally as having been provided by the observation of every-
day phenomena, and some other times in the form of higher conceptual and theo-
retical unification. The same is true for the interest- and distribution theory. 
3 Explanatory empirical progress? 
I have positioned Böhm-Bawerk’s interest and distribution theory as explanatory, 
not predictive, but it does not follow that there is no empirics – that is, no basis for 
producing evidence – to it. He subsumed many different phenomena under a 
description by one set of hypotheses and with the use of one set of concepts. The 
key hypotheses are LoMA and the law of diminishing marginal utility (for the 
value theory), the productivity of roundabout production methods (for the capital 
theory), and the three causes of surplus value of present over future goods (for the 
interest theory).  
The mechanistic approach offers a minimum level of complexity of the rede-
scription of economic phenomena that enables the economist to explain both how 
markets tend toward equilibrium and how disequilibria recur. In other words, the 
description of the mechanism explains stable patterns and instability. Classical 
‘political economy’ (but also much of 20th century neoclassical economics) cannot 
do this. As Hamminga phrases it, the Fundamentals of Economic Analysis of neo-
classical economics is ‘a functional framework which maps any data set on an 
equilibrium set’.24 This means that markets are supposed to be in equilibrium, 
rather than to be in perpetual flux. Neoclassical explanations perceive all market 
phenomena as either ‘already’ or ‘not yet’ equilibrium phenomena. The resulting 
focus on stability is apposite for explanations that come by lawlike regularities. 
After all, social (quasi-)laws apply to relatively stable environments, free of exter-
nal shocks for some reasonable period of time. A body of phenomena must strike 
the observer as constant to make lawlike parlance intelligible. (This is not to say 
that the same cannot be claimed, to a certain extent, for the mechanistic ap-
proach.25) The point now is that the regularity account of economic phenomena 
forces the theoretician to insert ceteris paribus clauses. Tony Lawson26 is vigor-
ously fighting the dominant constant-conjunction view of economics, as I under-
stand it, because it does no justice to the necessary ontology for an explanation of 
socio-economic reality; it lacks metaphysical content. I am not sure whether this 
 
24 Hamminga (1983), p.41. 
25 Note that also explanations in terms of mechanisms must assume something to remain relatively 
stable, otherwise there is no structural relationship between the composite parts of the mechanism. 
Stathis Psillos has eloquently shown this as he noted that an analysis of causation in terms of coun-
terfactuals enters analyses of mechanisms. The mechanistic approach says that two events relate 
causally if there is a mechanism that connects them. This makes sense only if there is some constant 
conjunction at stake, and if we can think of what the mechanism would do if initial conditions were 
different. See Psillos (2004). See also chapter V as I quote James Woodward on a related issue. 





3. Are true claims about unobservables possible beyond mere reference of 
terms? 
4. Is there one best conceptualisation, or vocabulary, of W? 
An epistemological relativist would say ‘no’ to question 1. An epistemologi-
cal realist says ‘yes’ and has the choice to be agnostic or not about the reference of 
nonobservational terms. If not, he can still admit or deny. To say ‘no’ to question 2 
is to be a particular type of realist (i.e. an observational realist; a constructive em-
piricist would be agnostic). Clearly, constructive empiricists and observational 
realists have to form an opinion as to the status of the objects made visible by 
telescopes, electromicroscopes and many other instruments whose working relies 
on the truth of well developed observation theories. But stronger positions are 
available if you answer question 3 positively too and thereby choose to be a theory 
realist.28  
Arrived at this position, if you believe that, in principle, an infinite set of vo-
cabularies might adequately help to describe the object of research – the social or 
the natural – you answer question 4 negatively. It is the answer of a constructive 
realist and this is the position Kuipers defends. But an essentialist prefers one 
conceptualisation over the other and goes further than this by a quest for the best set 
of concepts. The previous two chapters have claimed that Böhm-Bawerk believed 
that this is a worthwhile operation and that he succeeded in effecting it. In addi-
tion, chapter II assessed Wicksell’s judgement as rather benign to this extremely 
strong claim. In WKR, Wicksell praised Böhm-Bawerk for his concept of time as a 
productive force and sharply contrasted it with competing conceptions, such as the 
one developed by Jevons. 
By the term ‘essentialism’ I refer to the belief that question 4 must be an-
swered positively: there is one best way to conceptualise the world in order to 
research it. This fits the view that essentialist explanations refer to kinds, as these 
are supposed to be fixed in reality. One may fight over the question whether a 
conical form that appears in reality is best described as a triangle (seen sideways) 
or as a circle (seen from below), but a better way to describe it would be as a cone 
(depending on one’s description objectives, that is). Perhaps the best way is still 
different, in terms of more than three dimensions.  
If Wicksell is right in his judgement that ‘time-as-productive-factor’ is the 
best explanatory concept, progress has been made possible by successfully ab-
stracting particular aspects of social phenomena from manifold appearances. These 
aspects may comprise any combination of objects, properties, and relations. In any 
case, they are aspects that identify social mechanisms shaping market outcomes: 
market mechanisms. These are rooted in the stable social structure of modern 
entrepreneurial capitalism. The social structures, in turn, are the ‘social kinds’ 
Böhm-Bawerk tried to dig up with his conceptual apparatus.  
 
28 In more recent work Kuipers also proposes a refinement by which it is possible to distinguish entity 
realism (terms for objects in reality refer) and structural realism (although such terms do not refer, 
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opposition is required. Stories quoting regular patterns in economic reality might 
as well make explanatory sense even if that reality is in flux. Moreover, such pat-
terns may actually exist in a changing world, at least for a (policy) relevant period 
of time. The point is not whether clauses theoretically exclude changes in initial 
conditions, but whether the theorems in which these clauses figure are false or not. 
The following chapter tries to prove that the use of such clauses need not involve 
falsity in any fundamental sense.  
This also sets idealization apart from abstraction as strategies of analysis. 
Glanced over superficially, the product of either epistemic procedure sometimes 
resembles the other, but they can be conceived of as each other’s inverse. In addi-
tion, this conclusion has consequences for the policy relevance of economics. 
4 Does abstraction involve essentialism? 
Explanatory progress, it seems, comes with the abstraction of concepts that help 
identify particular patterns or constitutive elements from a set of economic phe-
nomena. The story which tells how these elements cohere and what the patterns 
are like will be better as more phenomena can be subsumed under one single rede-
scription. Explanatory progress and explanatory unification come in a brace.  
But abstraction involves priors. What to abstract and what to ignore is to be 
decided intuitively, as with Hamminga’s SEPC, or on the basis of more explicit 
methodological rules that are prior, at least analytically if not in time, to theorising. 
Hans Radder has an interesting account of how concepts both abstract from ob-
served reality and structure the observations. I shall discuss his work in chapter V, 
which investigates to what extent the essentialist inclinations, which apparently 
buttress conceptual developments in economics, can be philosophically upheld.  
Essentialism can for now loosely be characterised as a meta-judgement say-
ing that scientists refer to natural kinds in order to explain. In giving the notion 
somewhat more precision I follow Kuipers’ hierarchy of epistemological positions. 
He lists five questions, the answer to which helps identify the particular episte-
mology that some philosopher adheres to.27 The sequence of questions and an-
swers resembles a forensic inquiry: do you confess or deny? It is a hierarchy, for 
any question presupposes that a previous question has been answered. 
The first is a basic question in the sense that it ontologically grounds the 
subsequent epistemological positions. To say no to this question is to be an onto-
logical idealist, or worse, a solipsist and it would leave very little room for a choice 
between epistemologies. That is why it is counted (by Kuipers) as question zero. 
0. Is there an independent natural (social) world W? 
1. Are true claims about W possible? 
2. Are true claims about W possible beyond the observable? 
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The question is: are present day economists also inclined to conceive of theo-
retical economics as ‘finding the right vocabulary’? I think so. Let me devote some 
reflection to realism – even essentialism – in economics, and to some more indica-
tions that the economic science’s tacit self-conception is often essentialist. 
5 Is economics involved with essences? 
In 1976, Robert Lucas wrote an influential paper, which is now referred to as the 
‘Lucas Critique’.29 Already in 1971 he had suggested that, if we take the meaning of 
the word ‘rational’ seriously, rational people use all the available knowledge, 
including economic models. The 1976 critique holds that the outcome of policy 
changes  cannot be predicted without knowledge of the parameters that describe 
individual behaviour. In the Keynesian tradition, macroeconomic models would 
render policy advice assuming that markets (the agents who populate markets) 
would be kept in a network of invariant relationships if authorities such as central 
bankers changed policy. The exogenous variables of the model were supposed to 
remain unaltered. Lucas understood that the ‘deep structure’ of economic relation-
ships between agents and authority would be affected by policy changes, for in-
stance because expectations would be affected. If this is correct, the conclusion 
must be that macroeconomic policy requires microeconomic analysis even if the 
relation between macro and micro is fuzzy. Macroeconomists must again focus 
their curiosity on deep parameters concerning individual behaviour. 
The Lucas Critique assumes that individuals entering (financial) markets 
form expectations on the basis of the models that policy making authorities build. 
In his Conversations with economists, Arjo Klamer reports an interview with Lucas. 
He asks how we (or rather: his students) have to believe that agents can be ex-
pected to form expectations on the basis of economic models that are beyond their 
comprehension. Lucas responds as follows.30  
“I try to turn it around. People in business usually like to get into conversa-
tions about what they do all day and how they make their decisions. I’m al-
ways impressed with how sophisticated their thinking and information-
processing is. What puzzles me is the number of economists who seem to be-
lieve the reverse. It would be a miracle if I could write down a model for the 
demand for shoes and the supply of shoes, cook up a little difference equa-
tion, solve it, and the solution would reveal profits available to me from the 
shoe business that weren’t obvious to people working in the shoe business for 
20, 30, 40 years. It seems ludicrous that we could discover sizable rents with 
our simple equations without knowing anything about shoes. But some 
economists think we can get an insight into someone else’s business without 
knowing anything of the substance of his business.” 
One page further down, Lucas says: 
 
29 Lucas (1976). 





“There is nothing descriptive in demand theory in terms of the process by which 
human people, families, and whole business firms make decisions. Econo-
mists have lived with that for years.” 
It is laid out here that economists may be making models, but real people who 
make the decisions know their thing. Economic actors are instrumentally and 
cognitively rational. The theory makers have to model this situation for their own 
purposes, but this modelling is not a reproduction of reality in any descriptive 
sense.  
This is reminiscent of PTK. Böhm-Bawerk also notes how ordinary people 
know what to do in everyday decision making without the sort of human delibera-
tions that Austrian economic theory is modelling. Normal decision making is the 
result of experience and routine. The models of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk and Mises 
aim to reveal a formal structure of the decision making process without pretending 
to actually literally describe what it feels like, as it were, to decide as a consumer, 
as a demander or supplier on business-to-business markets or on the labour mar-
ket. It is a ‘re-description’31 of the story a real decision taker would tell you, even if 
this agent would not redescribe it in the same way. The quote shows that Lucas has 
similar reservations as these Austrians: he sees economic theory as a redescription 
of the layman’s description, which deviates from a description that is truthful 
about the concrete details of the world of economic agents. Moreover, he general-
ises this view so as to ascribe it to the broad ‘economists’ in the last quote.  
It is possible to explain this view on the discipline with the help of the fa-
mous ‘instrumentalist’ account of economics known from Milton Friedman. His 
essay ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ has had much impact on econo-
mists around the word, not least at the LSE. It puts forward the view that neither 
economists nor their lay public need bother about the ‘realism’ (as he calls it) of the 
assumptions of economic theories. The way in which theories withstand tests is 
supposed to be the only criterion on the basis of which to judge their usefulness. 
This critique has become known as the ‘F-twist’. Social scientists see the conformity 
of the assumptions of a theory to reality as an additional requirement to the test of 
the predictions. Dead wrong, says Friedman. He stresses that: 
[t]ruly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have “assump-
tions” that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in 
general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions. 
[…] The reason is simple: A hypothesis is important if it explains much by lit-
tle, that is, if it abstracts the common and the crucial elements from the mass of com-
plex and detailed circumstances[.]32 
Friedman does not only claim that the realisticness of the assumptions of a theory 
is not needed, but that it is not even desired. Scientifically interesting truth does 
not come about by maximizing the accuracy of all the descriptions. The ‘crucial 
elements’ (from the mass of complex circumstances) are doing the job. The postula-
 
31 Uskali Mäki shows how Austrian explanation can be seen as ‘redescription’. See appendix 3. 
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tion of such a scientifically interesting truth has metaphysical bearing.33 Indeed, the 
essay sometimes even suggests a strong type of realism: 
A fundamental hypothesis of science is that appearances are deceptive and 
that there is a way of looking at or interpreting or organizing the evidence 
that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be mani-
festations of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure.34 
I draw the conclusion that Lucas has the same normative stance towards 
economics as Milton Friedman, although he does not mention him. Like Böhm-
Bawerk, Lucas wants sufficient complexity, but he rejects descriptions and calls for a 
redescription in relatively simple terms, at least compared to the actual complexity 
of economic life. The question is if his critique is an attempt to get to the best the-
ory. 
Klamer asks whether Lucas is after truth. He responds: 
Yeah. But I don’t know what we mean by truth in our business. I don’t see 
economics as pushing that deeply in some respects. We’re programming ro-
bot imitations of people, and there are real limits on what you can get out of 
that.35 
The answer is mixed. ‘Yes, I want true theories, but no, I don’t know whether I can 
get that deep’. One can’t help feeling that yes, he looks for deep structures, but no, 
for he is not as optimistic as Böhm-Bawerk with respect to the idea that economics 
can ultimately succeed in doing that. He does not pretend to be infallible.  
John O’Neill blemishes an inclination to confuse essentialism as a metapro-
position with false claims done by essentialist authors. Especially postmodernists, 
he says, who ‘celebrate difference and diversity’ sometimes say that a belief in the 
explanatory value of the ‘essential nature’ of things is to deny difference.36 True, it 
is easy to fall into the trap of pinning down objects or worse, people, in the search 
of their essence. This is how women have been held fixed in their roles by reference 
to gender, or inhabitants of colonies by reference to race; it is how essentialist 
expositions can help exploitation. But one need not be insensitive to possible mis-
takes in explanations by reference to kinds. Essentialism and fallibilism are com-
patible.  
It is relevant to this thesis that O’Neill also observes the following about es-
sentialism and social science:37 
Contractual and personal relations are essentially different in virtue of the 
meanings constitutive of them. In this respect at least, the essential natures of 
social objects are different from those of natural objects. However, the essen-
tialist need have no difficulty in recognizing that the objects of the human sci-
ences do have such distinct properties. 
 
33 Dan Hammond observed the realist, rather than instrumentalist, orientation of Friedman’s essay as he 
considered the other essays from the book. See Hammond (1990). 
34 Friedman, Milton (1953), p.33. Emphasis mine. Mäki has noted the apparent essentialist, rather than 
instrumentalist, import of this paragraph, especially due to the word fundamental. Eric Schliesser 
reads Friedman’s essay as Kantian rather than essentialist. See Schliesser (2006). 
35 Klamer (1983), p.49. 
36 O’Neill (2001), p.170. 





Those opposed against essentialist views of science often deny that true 
theories are an attainable goal in science. So many a theory seemed to give the 
answer to lots of what scientists wanted to know, only to be replaced by another, 
incompatible theory later. Newtonian mechanics was a paradigm after the once 
robust Aristotelian world view, but it was replaced by Einstein’s General Theory of 
Relativity. It is important to remark that essentialism merely holds that scientists 
have to try and find the best vocabulary in order to formulate the strongest true 
theory, not that they have already found it. So I say again: essentialism and fallibil-
ity are not contradictory. 
The a priori plausibility convictions that Hamminga tracked in the work of 
international trade economists fit into a view of economics as essentialist. The 
world is believed to behave in a certain way and no other. Economists try to carve 
up that world in such a way that this particular behaviour is made intelligible. 
There is a truth to be discovered, if the carving is just right. One can encounter this 
preconceived notion of science among economists all over the place. Insofar as they 
propose new concepts and other explanatory building blocks that help erect alter-
native models, they insist that the new conception picks out something we lacked 
so far in order to construct satisfactory explanations. This is a natural attitude not 
reserved to Austrians. Take current experimental research aimed at feeding the 
theory of incomplete contracts. There is a paper by Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiner, 
reporting an experiment by which subjects play the roles of agents in the labour 
market. After deciding on a price for the service and a quality level supplied, the 
subjects enter a second phase in which the labourer decides what level of quality to 
actually deliver. A high quality means a negative payoff, a low quality means fines 
and exclusion from trade. ‘Reciprocity’ is the crucial (essential) concept at stake in 
this research. The neglect of the presence of motives determined by the existence of 
reciprocity in human interactions is taken to seriously miss the point of the work-
ing of markets. Thus, Fehr et al. argue that: 
the neglect of reciprocity motives may lead to wrong predictions […] recipro-
cal behavior may cause an increase in the set of enforceable contracts and may 
thus allow the achievement of nonnegligible efficiency gains.38 
[M]odern principal-agent theory has so far not been concerned with the im-
pact of reciprocity on contract terms and their enforcement. Our results indi-
cate, however, that the neglect of reciprocity may render principal agent mod-
els seriously incomplete.39 
We can see that some of the building blocks of an explanatory theory are 
seen as essential. Perhaps the use of the word ‘seriously’ expresses this most 
clearly. All models, by their very nature, are incomplete. But Fehr et al. refer to 
something more severe than just incompleteness of the description of an aspect of 
the world. They find the missing links ‘serious’, they accuse competing economists 
of having done a bad job. Fehr et al. want to explain by a better conceptual appara-
tus. Is it the best conception? It is not likely that they would be so daring as to claim 
 
38 Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiner (1997), p.833. 
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this. But I guess that they would probably hold that economic research, in the end, 
is walking en route for the use of ever better conceptions. 
I think it is only natural that any scientific work, including social scientific 
work, is upheld by a tacit ‘feeling of essentialism’, for the following reason. Daily 
scientific scrutiny into the nature of the material and socio-economic world does 
not invite a scientist to linger much over the fact that one’s prior conceptual 
schemes are contingent and that other people – the lay public, scientists from other 
cultures, or of the other sex – may conceptualise the world differently. The natural 
attitude of scientists will be to assume that their conceptual scheme is the most 
obvious and the most convenient one, if not the only one that leads to true theories. 
Only when we choose to consider, at the metalevel, as it were, the relativity of 
schemes the appreciation for a pluralist world view is born. This is not to say that 
scientists, by default, can never have such an appreciation. But it comes in very 
handy to fail to engage ourselves with pluralism so long as one conceptual scheme 
helps understand the meaning of our categorisations. I have little reason to engage 
in pluralist metaconsiderations while observing the world in ways that are suited 
to my interests, even if I can appreciate the possibility to do so; yes, even if I can 
appreciate the fruitfulness of doing so in other contexts. 
As philosophers we can look down on this attitude. But I think it is weird to 
dismiss forms of essentialism purely on analytical grounds and just ignore the 
ubiquity of it in and out of science. It seems more plausible to accept its descriptive 
adequacy and see to what extent it can be made sound analytically. This is what I 
to do in the last chapter. 
